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Introduction 
The small, medium and micro enterprise (SMME) sector spans an immense sweep of 
economic activity, from entirely non-regulated to entirely regulated businesses, 'from the 
survivalist activities of informal sector hawkers to high-tech manufacturing enterprises 
employing fewer than 200 workers'. 1   It comprises, in reality, a multitude of subsectors of 
different branches of the economy, each with its own specific issues, problems and 
potentialities.  In addressing the issue of industrial relations, it will be neither appropriate 
nor fruitful to try to deal with this multifaceted 'sector' in its entirety.  In the first place, 
most informal enterprises are conducted by single individuals, families or partnerships and 
do not involve employment relationships in the normal meaning of the term. 2   In the 
second place, much informal activity is conducted by unemployed persons seeking merely to 
maintain themselves until jobs become available.  Such enterprises are transient and 
difficult to target or track for purposes of industrial relations policy.  Thirdly, structured 
collective labour relations as we know them are in many respects premised on the realities 
of larger workplaces and may be less appropriate to workplaces employing only one, two or 
a handful of people. 
This article is therefore concerned with (a) enterprises employing people in de facto 
employment relationships (whether in the formal or informal sectors); (b) what may be 
termed 'entrepreneurial' rather than survivalist activity, and (c) primarily (though not 
exclusively) 'small' and 'medium' rather than 'micro' enterprises. 3   The term 'SMME 
sector' is used in this qualified 
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sense hereafter.  This is not to disregard the problems of the poorest of the poor.  Rather, 
it is to assert that their struggle for subsistence falls beyond the scope of industrial relations 
policy; it is a challenge to the agencies of economic development and social security rather 
than those concerned with relations between employer and employee. 
More particularly, the article focuses on entrepreneurial SMMEs in the context of a modern, 
developing economy.  On the one hand it is true that the majority of our working 
population still labours under third-world conditions; and some would argue that this should 
be our benchmark.  According to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, for example, lower labour 
costs are essential to newly industrializing countries competing in the global market place: 
'Remove that and they would lose their only competitive advantage.' 4   In South Africa 
such an approach is only too familiar.  It was taken to extremes in the apartheid era with 
its numerous devices for depressing the cost of labour such as the bantustan system, the 
border areas policy and repression of trade union rights.  Hopefully, it has now been buried 
together with apartheid.  Thus the Ministry of Trade and Industry, having taken note of it, 
suggests a different approach: 
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 'A view more in line with the RDP and modern international thinking holds that a high skills base and higher 
motivation among the work force results in higher levels of productivity, which enhances the competitiveness of 
enterprises.' 5 
Finally, the article confines itself to issues of industrial relations policy aimed at extending 
basic labour rights; it does not attempt to argue the case for imposing specific conditions of 
employment.  Wages, hours of work and the like will be influenced crucially by economic 
and other conditions in the industry, subsector or enterprise concerned.  While it is 
universally accepted that certain abuses (e g child labour) should be prohibited, it is equally 
widely accepted that conditions of employment should be determined by the participants 
themselves, ideally by means of collective bargaining.  This is certainly the position in 
South Africa, as explained in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
guaranteed by the interim Constitution. 6 
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Industrial Relations in the Smme Sector 
The importance of constructive industrial relations to socio-economic development has given 
rise to a vast literature, not to mention a vast industry, and needs no elaboration here.  
From this standpoint the SMME sector internationally has been a source of concern at least 
since the early 1970's.  Thus, in an early analysis of the informal sector in Kenya, Leys 
identified 'intense exploitation of labour, with very low wages and often very long hours 
underpinned by the constant pressure for work from the ''reserve army'' of job seekers'. 7   
Twenty years on the Director-General of the International Labour Organization criticized 'the 
non-compliance of the informal sector with labour legislation and basic labour standards'. 8 
Abuses such as these, however, are not confined to the informal sector.  A study of 
Western Cape hives owned by the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) in 1991 
revealed a number of problem areas ranging from inadequate health and safety precautions 
to neglect of basic labour rights. 9   Although a systematic study of working conditions in 
SMMEs in the formal sector remains to be conducted, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
violations of labour rights and protective laws are considerably more widespread here than 
in the hives. 10   Union density, except where closed-shop agreements are operative, 
ranges from low to non-existent.  In much of the SMME sector the old South Africa lives on: 
labour's hard-won rights are practically a dead letter and collective bargaining is perceived 
as a threat. 11   Among workers, not surprisingly, the study revealed attitudes ranging 
from caution to fear at the prospect of joining a union. 
If the principles of the RDP and the interim Constitution are to be extended to those areas 
of the SMME sector where they have 
1995 ILJ p547 
not yet reached, such fears and suspicions will need to be addressed.  The starting-point 
should be that collective bargaining is not a bureaucratic device for foisting unrealistic 
demands on employers; it should be a transparent process for working out terms and 
conditions of employment that both employers and workers can live with and, hopefully, 
prosper under.  As such, it is as relevant to small enterprises as to large. 
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Industrial Relations and National Development 
The struggle of organized labour against oppressive, archaic employment relations has been 
a driving force in South Africa's political transformation; the ongoing drive for worker 
empowerment, it has been recognized, could play no less important a role in the country's 
socio-economic transformation.  As Anstey argued in 1990: 
 'Nation-building will require a capacity for labour-management parties to move beyond the adversarialism 
inherent in their relationship, to a more open acknowledgement of their interdependence and the creative 
development of co-operative endeavour as well.' 12 
This theme has become part of the fabric of the RDP.  As the RDP White Paper today 
expresses it: 
 'Industrial democracy will facilitate [sic] greater worker participation and decision-making in the workplace.  
The empowerment of workers will be enhanced through access to company information.  Human resource 
development and education and training are key inputs into policies aimed at higher employment, the 
introduction of more advanced technologies, and reduced inequalities.' 13 
Industrial democracy in this context refers principally to collective bargaining over 
conditions of employment and worker participation in management decisions on production 
related issues - a policy which has become more tangible with the publication of the Draft 
Labour Relations Bill in February 1995. 14   While collective bargaining and worker 
participation may not in themselves be sufficient to secure the aims of the RDP at the level 
of industrial relations, they are, unquestionably, stepping stones towards achieving them.  
Though the draft bill makes inadequate provision for accommodation of the SMME sector (as 
will be argued more 
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fully below), it cannot contemplate excluding them from these aims. 
 
 
The Existing System 
Anecdotal evidence of the burdens imposed on SMMEs by the extension of industrial council 
agreements 15   is legion.  Yet more systematic studies suggest that legal regulation is a 
relatively minor problem for most SMME employers. 16   An explanation for these 
apparently contradictory positions may be the fact that labour legislation is frequently a 
dead letter in the SMME sector.  According to Theron, therefore, the attitudes of small 
entrepreneurs 'would change if labour legislation were vigorously enforced'. 17   Where 
industrial council agreements are enforced, this suggests, hardship to SMMEs may well 
result to the extent that such agreements do not take the position of SMMEs into account. 
18 
The limited degree of enforcement and the absence of systematic research makes it difficult 
to generalize with any accuracy.  It does appear, however, that employers' organizations in 
a majority of industries are, unsurprisingly, dominated by larger and more powerful 
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companies.  Notwithstanding guidelines from the Department of Labour requiring industrial 
councils to weigh up the interests of SMMEs when drawing up agreements, the enormous 
variability among industrial councils in terms of size and organization gives little ground for 
confidence that such guidelines will be uniformly adhered to or, indeed, that the interests of 
SMMEs will be articulated at all. 
Representativity of SMMEs on industrial councils 
Lack of representation of SMME employers, despite the requirement of the LRA that an 
industrial council may only be registered if the industrial registrar considers it to be 
'sufficiently representative' of the industry concerned, 19   thus emerges as a first and most 
obvious problem of the existing dispensation.  Given the low degree of unionization among 
employees in SMMEs, precisely the same can be said of the representation of the latter. 
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The draft bill addresses the problem by requiring, firstly, that 'adequate provision' should be 
made in the constitution of bargaining councils (replacing industrial councils) for 'the 
representation of small and medium enterprises' 20   and, secondly, by defining 'sufficiently 
representative' as meaning representation of a majority of employees in the industry as well 
as employers employing a given percentage of employees in the industry. 21   As the 
widespread disregard of the existing s 19(3) of the LRA shows, however, 'provision' does 
not mean the same as effective implementation of such provision.  Also, SMMEs almost 
invariably account for a minority of employees in any given industry, so that bigger firms 
may well continue to be deemed 'representative' of the industry unless NEDLAC fixes the 
percentage, referred to above, at a high enough level to ensure that substantial numbers of 
SMMEs will need to be included. 
The lack of employee representation is not addressed at all. 
Extension of agreements and applications for exemption 
Despite the problem of representativity, a request by an industrial council is enough to 
trigger extension of the agreement to the whole of the industry concerned. 22   Once an 
agreement is extended, the only remedy for parties who feel unable to comply with it is to 
apply for exemption. 23   A second problem is the bureaucratic and undemocratic nature of 
the procedures for extension as well as exemption applications. 
In the case of applications for exemption, no formal criteria are laid down by the LRA. 24   
Recent research suggests that no standard procedures are observed by industrial councils, 
that applications are frequently by letter and that applicants are not in all cases permitted to 
state their case in person. 25   It would also appear, however, that the vast majority of 
exemption applications presented to industrial councils are granted.  The problem thus 
appears to be neither the complexity of exemption procedures nor, in most cases, an 
obdurate attitude on the part of councils.  Rather, judging by the relatively small number of 
exemption applications reaching councils, it might be that many SMME employers unable to 
comply with an agreement simply do not go through the formality of applying for 
exemption. 
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Contrary to the more familiar criticism of the system, therefore, it may be that the parties 
most severely prejudiced by the present system are workers in SMMEs (or other 
enterprises) who may find themselves deprived of wages, working conditions and benefits 
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provided for by industrial council agreements on mere application by their employer.  Space 
does not permit a full discussion of the issue here; questions remaining to be examined 
include (a) whether an industrial council may adversely alter terms and conditions of 
employment without affording a fair hearing to the employees affected; and (b) the legality 
of unilateral alteration of terms and conditions of employment which are deemed to have 
been incorporated into each employee's contract of employment. 
The draft bill states that a bargaining council agreement may only be extended if it provides 
'for the expeditious granting of exemptions to non-parties . . . by an independent body on 
the grounds of undue hardship'. 26   Again, given the diversity of existing industrial 
councils, it remains to be seen what effect is given to such a provision in practice, who the 
'independent bodies' will consist of and how they are expected to perform differently from 
industrial councils or their existing exemption committees.  Moreover, while stipulating that 
the parties requesting extension shall be 'representative' in the sense discussed above, the 
draft bill does not appear to require any form of representation of employees affected by 
such applications. 
Lack of flexibility 
A third feature of the existing system, reflecting its historical origins in the heyday of 
Fordism, is the standardization of working conditions and working practices which the 
extension of agreements presupposes.  Modern technology and managerial technique, 
however, place an increasing premium on flexibility.  The rigid nature of the existing 
system, with compliance or exemption being the only two legal options, has resulted in a 
significant degree of informalization, decentralization and withdrawal of employer parties 
from industrial councils, causing them to collapse.  Though this problem affects all 
enterprises, SMMEs are particularly involved to the extent that decentralization has opened 
up new niches for subcontracting and other forms of linkages.  The draft bill does not 
address this complex situation but passes the ball to unions and employers: it authorizes 
them to reach legally binding agreements on 'any' matter of mutual interest (draft bill 
clause 183) which may then be extended to the whole industry. 
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Addressing the Problems of the Present System 
Guidelines for addressing these problems, to the extent that they affect SMMEs, are 
suggested by the MTI Discussion Paper.  In 'working towards a new dispensation for labour 
in small enterprises', it says government will support reform in inter alia the following 
respects: 
(a) 'The particular needs and interests of small enterprises should be accommodated 
through greater flexibility and simplicity in the present system of collective bargaining.  
Rather than moving towards blanket exemptions from industrial council agreements . . 
. industrial council agreements should become more representative of industry in 
general and SMMEs in particular. On this basis industrial council agreements could be 
negotiated to make specific provision for the needs and interests of small enterprises'; 
and 
Copyright JUTA & Co (Pty) Ltd 
 
 
(b) 'government will investigate and support initiatives for encouraging a greater degree 
of organization of workers and employers in this sector as well as voluntary 
participation by employers in collective bargaining'. 27 
Two questions are thrown up by this approach.  One is the legal question of the framework 
in which industrial (or bargaining) council agreements could be recast in order to achieve 
the aim described in (a) above.  The second is the more complex organizational question, 
with important policy overtones, of how employers and workers can be 'encouraged' to 
organize and participate in collective bargaining. 
Evolving a new framework for collective bargaining 
Working on the assumption that 'flexibility does not equal decentralization', Baskin 28   has 
put forward an interesting proposal for a unified approach to collective bargaining at 
national, industrial and plant levels.  In contrast to the industry-only approach reflected in 
the LRA and draft bill, Baskin proposes that industrial (bargaining) councils 'would normally 
set basic conditions and broad frameworks' only, 'and then devolve bargaining downwards 
(or upwards) whenever appropriate'.  In consequence, each such agreement 'would 
normally include a range of schedules to accommodate specific conditions facing particular 
sections of that industry'. 29   On this basis the SMME sector within each industry could be 
dealt with by means of a special schedule dedicated specifically to its needs.  On the face of 
it, moreover, this approach 
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would appear to be compatible with COSATU's policy on collective bargaining. 30 
Even special schedules, of course, may not accommodate all SMMEs.  To the extent that 
cases of 'undue hardship' remain, provision for exemption remains necessary although as a 
last rather than a first resort.  In addition to the guidelines of the draft bill, it is submitted 
that such provision should include clearer criteria for the procedure as well as the 
adjudication of exemption applications. 
Encouraging organization in the SMME sector for collective bargaining purposes 
As agreed instruments of collective bargaining, special SMME schedules would require 
representative organizations of SMME employers and unions representing workers in SMMEs 
to negotiate them.  In the absence of a practicable way of bringing this about, the 'special 
schedules' option would be fatally flawed by the lack of representativity of many industrial 
councils. 
The problem, it is submitted, should be viewed in a broader context.  The LRA, the draft bill 
and indeed the interim Constitution reflect the deeply ingrained tradition of voluntarism in 
our law of collective bargaining.  For purposes of this discussion, it will be accepted that a 
practical solution to the problem can be sought only on this basis.  The existing lack of 
organization in the SMME sector reflects the absence of inducements to engage in collective 
bargaining within the framework of industrial relations itself.  To find such inducements, it 
will be necessary to look at the policy being proposed for SMME development in its entirety. 
The operative part of such a policy would be to make it beneficial for small employers, in 
financial and other terms, to comply with policy requirements such as those under 
discussion.  Possible benefits could include the following: 31 
 Reservation of certain types of products for manufacturing by eligible SMMEs. 
Copyright JUTA & Co (Pty) Ltd 
 
 
 Assisted access to procurement markets of public sector enterprises, state 
departments, provincial and local government for eligible SMMEs. 
 Access to finance mobilized by private sector financial institutions (possibly in terms of 
a state guarantee scheme) or specialized financial institutions for the needs of eligible 
SMMEs. 
 Tax incentives and specialized tax rates for eligible SMMEs. 
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 Access to properly serviced start-up premises and structures for eligible SMMEs. 
 Rent subsidies for eligible SMMEs. 
 Access to the support provided by local service centres, including the assistance of 
mentors, access to new technology and training in business skills as well as job skills, 
for eligible SMMEs. 
 Access to targeted assistance programmes (e g tourism industry, transport sector, 
etc) for eligible SMMEs. 
Each statute or set of regulations making provision for the above or other forms of 
assistance to SMMEs would, necessarily, have to define the category of SMMEs eligible for 
such assistance.  In addition to the technical features of each definition, it is submitted that 
all definitions should incorporate a number of requirements with which any SMME would 
need to comply in order to qualify for public assistance.  These might include: 
 Registration with the appropriate industrial (bargaining) council. 32 
 Membership of an appropriate employers' organization for industrial council purposes. 
 Observance of the norms of freedom of association in the workplace. 
 Adherence to affirmative action. 
 Compliance with industrial council agreements, schedules to industrial council 
agreements and any other collective agreement, wage regulatory instrument, 
legislation or regulations applicable to work or working conditions in such workplace. 
The above suggestions are tentative; the precise requirements of eligibility for state support 
should be subject to thorough consultation, within the framework of the law, to ensure that 
all genuine problems are taken into account and all options are considered.  The underlying 
principle, however, should be clear.  No one can compel SMME employers, or any other 
citizen, to promote the aims of public policy or to refrain from lawful activities which they 
consider to be to their own advantage.  Conversely, however, the state cannot be expected 
to support activities which undermine the aims of public policy. 
Public policy, as embodied in the RDP, clearly sets its face against the exploitation of labour 
as a means of stimulating SMME growth.  The new dispensation for small enterprises, it 
stipulates, 
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must 'not harm the interests of labour'. 33   A procurement policy supportive of small 
enterprise 'must, however, require appropriate labour standards for suppliers'. 34   These 
and other provisions make clear that public support for SMMEs is not conceived of as a 
blank cheque but, rather, as a form of partnership in the nation-building project. 
In the same vein, the RDP White Paper states: 
 'In recognising the value of this [the SMME] sector in the generation of new employment and competitiveness, 
the Government will endeavour to bring small and medium enterprises into the regulatory framework for labour 
standards.' 35 
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By targeting for support those SMMEs which subscribe to recognized industrial relations 
standards, it is submitted, the government would be acting within the mandate on which it 
was elected. 
ENCOURAGING ORGANIZATION AMONG EMPLOYEES IN SMMES 
The promotion of employer organization, however, would be only half the battle won.  
There can be no collective bargaining in the SMME sector without extending the frontiers of 
trade unionism.  Obstacles of quite a different order face unions in this task - inter alia 
employer hostility, the reluctance of workers to jeopardize their jobs, and the sheer 
logistical difficulties of organizing and servicing a multitude of workplaces containing 
relatively small numbers of members.  How can these problems be addressed? 36 
An integrated support programme for SMMEs, bringing with it greater commitment to fair 
employment practices and modern industrial relations on the part of employers, would 
undoubtedly increase the scope for workers to exercise their legal rights without 
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fear of victimization.  It should be recognized, however, that unionization is unlikely to 
increase significantly among workers in SMMEs without a change of attitude on the part of 
the unions.  Unions have tended to give little priority to the organization of workers in 
SMMEs as a result of the organizational difficulties involved, the relatively limited results 
attendant on such efforts and what are perceived as more pressing demands on their 
already strained resources. 
A number of measures could help to address these problems: 
 A support programme for the SMME sector as outlined above could include, at 
relatively little cost, subsidies to unions for the specific purpose of expanding their 
organizing efforts in that sector. 
 The establishment of worker representation in the workplace as proposed in the draft 
bill suggests possibilities for the extension of a union presence into unorganized 
workplaces.  Workplace forums with fairly extensive functions are called for, though 
only in workplaces employing 100 or more employees. 37   If this provision stands, it 
would exclude most of the SMME sector from the benefits identified by the draft bill.  
In addition, the draft bill provides for the election of trade union representatives with 
limited functions in workplaces employing ten or more members of a registered trade 
union. 38   Such representatives (or workplace forums, to the extent that the cut-off 
number for the latter is reduced before the bill is enacted) could emerge as focal 
points not only of shop-floor consultation but also of union recruitment in smaller 
enterprises. 
 The establishment of industrial districts to promote economic and technical 
cooperation among small employers could create territorial bases for trade union 
structures encompassing numbers of workplaces which might be too small to be 
organized individually.  This could be accommodated by making provision in the draft 
bill for the establishment of workplace forums covering more than one workplace 
under specified conditions - for example, in the same locality and/or engaged in the 
same branch of activity. 39 
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Development of Mechanisms for Monitoring Compliance With Legal Requirements 
Possibly the most serious weakness of the existing system is not so much the presence or 
absence of regulations applicable to SMMEs but, rather, the fact that such regulations are 
ignored to a very significant extent - in other words, the lack of an effective monitoring 
system.  Self-regulation by employers, subscribing to the costs of compliance in return for 
the greater benefits of doing so, would no doubt be the best mechanism and the hallmark of 
a successful industrial relations system.  In practice, unfortunately, this cannot be taken for 
granted.  Any proposals for new regulations aimed at promoting collective bargaining in the 
SMME sector should therefore simultaneously address the question of how, and to what 
extent, such regulations could be monitored or enforced.  The following are some 
possibilities: 
 Applications by employers for any of the benefits referred to above should be 
supported by a statement by a majority of the employees in such workplace, or a 
trade union or other organization representing a majority of employees, to the effect 
that certain specified requirements are being complied with. 
 Shop stewards could monitor industrial council agreements. 40 
 As is the case with certain statutes at present, all employees should have the right to 
report breaches of any of the requirements referred to above and enjoy statutory 
protection against victimization.  Since this in itself will have only a limited impact, 
annual reports from employees, in prescribed form, on particular aspects of work and 
working conditions could be a condition for continuation of benefits or public support. 
The draft bill takes a tentative step in this direction by giving trade union representatives 
the statutory capacity to monitor their employers' compliance with collective agreements or 
other law. 41   Workplace forums, too, may double as health and safety committees inter 
alia for the purpose of monitoring compliance with health and safety regulations. 42   
Further measures for giving employees a real stake in decision making at workplace level 
along the lines suggested above, it is submitted, would contribute to transforming the 
'adversarial' attitudes criticized in the MTI Discussion Paper.  It would also promote the 
RDP's broader objective of human resources development through the empowerment of 
workers in the workplace. 
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The Constitutional Dimension 
Advocates of what might be termed a 'free market' philosophy might object that measures 
designed to persuade SMME employers to join employers' associations impinge on their 
freedom of association.  It is submitted that this is not so.  Membership of any organization 
gives rise to certain duties and benefits.  Offering benefits to prospective members cannot 
be said - particularly in view of the general limitation on fundamental rights 43   - to violate 
the freedom of association of non-members. 
More cogently, the guarantee of freedom of economic activity contained in s 26(1) of the 
interim Constitution could be raised.  By disqualifying all SMME (and other) employers who 
fail to comply with certain criteria from tendering for public sector contracts, would 
parliament not be in breach of the interim Constitution? It is submitted that it would not.  
The interim Constitution immediately goes on to qualify the right to economic activity by 
stating that it can be limited to promote, inter alia, 'the quality of life, . . . human 
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development, social justice, basic conditions of employment [and] fair labour practices'. 44   
To the extent that the suggested measures might limit the economic freedom of employers 
who refuse to engage in collective bargaining, to register or otherwise to obey the law, it is 
submitted, they would be validated by s 26(2). 
Even more compelling is s 7(1) of the interim Constitution.  It states that the legislature 
and all executive organs of the state must comply with the Chapter on Fundamental Human 
Rights.  This would make it unlawful for parliament or any agency of public administration 
to violate the basic human rights of any citizen or to assist any other person to violate such 
rights.  One of the basic rights entrenched by the interim Constitution is that of freedom of 
association; another is the right to fair employment practices. 45   Failure or refusal by 
employers to permit employees the exercise of their rights to collective bargaining and/or 
fair employment practices should therefore (apart from any action they might be exposed to 
in the labour courts) disqualify them from assistance by any organ of state. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The details of the proposals contained in this article, and, of course, the problems they 
might encounter, remain to be examined more closely.  The guiding principle, however, 
should be 
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clear: it is to bring industrial relations in the SMME sector into line with the standards of the 
society we are seeking to build.  The effect should not be to impose unreasonable burdens 
on employers or obstacles to growth but, rather, to ensure that the SMME sector develops 
on healthy foundations.  SMMEs eligible for public support should develop into centres of 
excellence - vibrant components of the modern economy, setting an attractive precedent for 
others.  Pilot programmes could play an important part in testing the waters and charting 
the way forward. 
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 25 D du Toit, S Godfrey, M Goldberg, J Maree & J Theron Industrial Councils and Small Enterprises (Sociology 
Department and Labour Law Unit UCT 1995) especially ch 2. 
 26 clause 35(3)(d). 
 27 MTI Discussion Paper at 3.7.3; emphasis added. 
 28 Baskin at 15. 
 29 ibid. 
 30 as articulated at COSATU's Campaign Conference of 25-27 March 1994 and appended to Baskin. 
 31 The proposals that follow are based on those contained in part 3 of the MTI Discussion Document. 
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 32 Baskin, looking at possible measures for simplifying or encouraging SMME participation in industrial 
(bargaining) councils for the negotiation of special schedules, suggests inter alia 'linking exemptions or 
applicability of special conditions to registration of the SMME concerned' (Baskin at 17). 
 33 RDP at 4.4.7.4. 
 34 RDP at 4.4.7.7. 
 35 RDP at 3.10.4.  Similarly, in respect of job creation programmes COSATU argues that '[l]ow wages may not 
address poverty nor the developmental objectives envisaged by the RDP' and that labour standards on such 
programmes 'should mirror as far as possible what occurs in the formal employment sector' (L Seftel The 
RDP: Job Creation and Minimum Standards (unpublished paper presented to Labour Law Conference Durban 
July 1994) at 1).  This approach, based on what might be termed the 'conditionality' of public support for 
private initiative and insistence on developmental in addition to purely economic criteria, has an echo in 
international development policy.  Professor Freeman of Harvard University, for example, argues: 'The 
world can ill afford to let bankers' concerns dominate decisions on the global economy (especially when 
taxpayers/workers have to bail out the banks when they fail).  The concerns of workers, be they blue collar 
or white collar, be they in developed or less developed countries, must be part of the process' (R B Freeman 
'Work in a Global Economy' in International Labour Office Visions of the Future of Social Justice (ILO 1994) 
at 103.) It is also the position of the International Labour Organization (Seftel at 5). 
 36 For a more detailed examination of the problems, and discussion of some possible responses, see Du Toit & 
Bosch at 28-51. 
 37 In terms of chapter V of the draft bill.  It may be noted, for comparative purposes, that the minimum size of 
enterprises required to establish works councils in Germany is six employees.  In the Netherlands the 
minimum is 35, though employers with between ten and 35 employees are required to convene regular 
consultative meetings with their staff. 
 38 clause 13. 
 39 For a more detailed discussion of this and other models, see M Biagi 'Employee Representation in Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprise: A Comparative Overview' (1992) Comparative Labour Law Journal 257. 
 40 This option has already been implemented by, for example, the Transvaal Building Industry Council: cf Du Toit 
et al at 86-7. 
 41 clause 13(10)(b). 
 42 clause 64(4). 
 43 s 33(1). 
 44 s 26(2). 
 45 s 27. 
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